We formally investigate the effects of a food inspection system influencing food safety of foreign and domestic food products in the domestic market. Consumers purchase domestic and imported food and value food safety. Potential protectionism à la Fisher and Serra can arise: inspection frequency imposed on foreign producers set by a domestic social planner would be higher than the corresponding policy set by a global social planner treating all producers as domestic. The domestic social planner tends to impose most if not all of the inspection on foreign producers, which improves food safety for consumers and limits the production loss for domestic producers. Despite this protectionist component, inspections address a potential consumption externality such as health hazard in the domestic country when unsafe food can enter the country undetected. We then calibrate the analytical framework to the U.S. shrimp market incorporating key stylized facts of this market. Identifying protectionist inspection requires much information on inspection, safety, damages and costs. We also investigate how to finance the inspection policy from a social-planner perspective. Financing instruments differ between the domestic and international welfare-maximizing objectives.
Introduction
This paper formally explores the potential protectionism and effects of an inspection system to enforce a domestic food safety standard on domestic and foreign producers. The paper delineates the role of inspection as discriminatory trade barrier through foreign producers' difficulties to enter a market but also their legitimate role to internalize potential external effects from risk of illness.
Food safety regulations are a contentious issue in the context of North-South trade with contrasting views on safety regulations either as a barrier (Henson and Loader, 2001; Otsuki et al., 2001a and b; Wilson and Otsuki, 2004) or catalyst driven by consumer concerns (Anders and Caswell, 2009; Jaffee and Henson, 2005) . Most of these analyses have focused on standards rather than inspections. Inspections turn standards into implemented standards and determine the effective quality available on the market. Different inspection levels at the border and in domestic plants allow to effectively discriminate between foreign and domestic food producers and to impose differentiated implemented standard via different inspection rates even though the "official" uniform food standard applies to all producers. We focus on the economics of these inspections and analyze their role in trade as protectionist barrier but also as a way to internalize external health effects on consumers. Identifying protectionist inspections is more daunting than one would presume in presence of asymmetric safety levels between foreign and domestic firms.
We assume that a social planner chooses an optimum inspection level to enforce food safety that maximizes domestic welfare (surplus of consumers and domestic producers net of potential health externalities). The standard itself is assumed to have been fixed at a safe level, that is, at which no sickness or negative external effect occurs. Potential protectionism à la Fisher and Serra arises: inspection frequency imposed on foreign producers set by a domestic social planner would be higher than the corresponding policies set by a global planner treating all producers as domestic.
The domestic social planner tends to impose the total or a large part of the inspection on foreign producers to shift cost abroad. Food safety improves (especially for imported food), and domestic producers' losses are limited. Despite this protectionist component, the inspection addresses a consumption externality such as health hazard in the domestic country when unsafe food can enter the country undetected.
The paper then applies the conceptual framework to the U.S. seafood market and more specifically to shrimp. The United States is a significant producer and importer of seafood products. Seafood imports are seldom inspected at the border, raising the issue of unsafe food being imported. Cases of contaminated and unsafe seafood imports have been reported despite extensive food safety standards in existence (Southern Shrimp Alliance, 2007; U.S. Government Accountability Office - GAO, 2001 GAO, , 2004 GAO, , and 2009 ). When inspections occur, they often reveal imported products failing U.S. food safety standards (GAO, 2001 and . Safety problems also affect domestic production, where many products are not processed following existing food safety regulation (GAO, 2001 and . Hence, our set-up and approach fully apply to the U.S. seafood market with its safety standards and inspections at the border and in domestic plants.
Using recent econometric estimates of consumer and producer price responses, cost of production data, and information on the cost of meeting food safety standards for seafood exporting countries, we calibrate a partial equilibrium model of the U.S. shrimp market including imports to derive the socially optimum inspection levels conditioned on a food safety standard.
Consumers in the United States and other advanced countries have repeatedly expressed their willingness to pay for better and safer seafood products in the market place and in laboratory experiments. We show that even though the optimal policy is protectionist (as defined in the previous paragraph), it is optimal for an importing country to impose differential implemented standards via tighter inspections on foreign producers.
We also determine the optimum way to finance the inspection policy from a socialplanner's perspective. Financing instruments are different under the domestic welfaremaximizing objective as opposed to the case of the international welfare-maximizing objective inclusive of foreign profits.
Related Literature
The results of this paper differ from the previous literature on standards and protectionism (Fisher and Serra 2000; Marette and Beghin, 2010) by focusing on inspections to implement discriminatory effective standards, rather than the standard itself. We also depart from the existing literature on borders inspection, by providing a complete welfare analysis with both conceptual and empirical contributions. From an empirical point of view, the results of this study contribute to the literature on food safety inspection by providing a complete welfare analysis with calibrated estimations. Previous papers by Mayer et al. (2004) , Starbird (2005 Starbird ( , 2007 and Starbird and Amanor-Boadu (2006) restricted their analyses to the supply chain organization and the determination of inspection policy without explicitly considering consumers' welfare.
In addition, our results extend the literature on how to finance inspections to an openeconomy context. In particular, Crespi and Marette (2001) study different types of financing instruments without considering trade issues with foreign producers. We show the consequences of considering foreign welfare rather than just domestic welfare on financing options.
Regarding the shrimp market, our approach differs from previous seafood studies which focus only on the ex post evaluation of past measures and imports (Cato and Lima dos Santos, 1998; Debaere, 2005; Anders and Caswell, 2009, among others) . Our analysis evaluates future potential, i.e., ex ante, policy with a simulation integrating welfare measure, market imperfections, and consumers' valuation of food safety attributes, which can assist decision makers and inform the public policy debate. Our analysis follows the approach proposed by van Tongeren et al. (2009) but with the added focus on inspection rather than the standard itself.
Among the ex post analyzes of food safety issues with seafood imports, Anders and Caswell (2009) Cato and Lima dos Santos (1998) suggest that the 1997 EU ban on shrimp imports originating from Bangladesh pushed the same shrimps to be exported to Japan and the United States, raising the issue of differential standards and inspection levels across importing countries.
More recently, Nguyen and Wilson (2009) estimate a panel gravity model on U.S., European, and Japanese imports of seafood products using disaggregated seafood data and a theoretically consistent gravity model controlling for multilateral resistance. The trade impact of food safety standards is negative and significant but differentiated across seafood products. Shrimps appear to be the most sensitive to changing food safety policies, while fish is the least sensitive.
Using data on shrimp trade Debaere (2005) empirically investigates the effect of trade policy on international prices and on countries' welfare. He shows that EU trade policy (especially strict standards on antibiotic residues compared to the ones applied by the United States) significantly impacted the world shrimp market and shifted exports away from Europe towards the United States in the late 1990s and early 2000s with the added consequence of depressing U.S. prices for shrimp. Hudson et al. (2003) investigate ex-ante the effects of a potential ban on shrimp imports by the United States from countries non-complying with the Turtle Excluder Device system. They estimate a linear expenditure system to obtain the own-price elasticity of demand for shrimp imports. They find that such a ban will generate a welfare loss for U.S. consumers. The magnitude of the effect will depend on whether lost imports from banned countries are reallocated to other countries. Alberini et al. (2008) propose a theoretical model of enforcement and compliance in a regulatory environment similar to the one created by HACCP in the seafood industry. Predictions on optimal Food and Drug Administration (FDA) monitoring strategy and firms' compliance efforts are derived. Using FDA seafood inspection data, the authors show that, contrary to the predictions of the model, FDA inspections are based on product risk but not on past compliance.
On the other hand, firms' compliance efforts do not increase with the threat of an inspection. Disdier and Marette (2010) combine the results of a gravity equation with a partial equilibrium model to determine the welfare impact of a standard. They estimate the effect of a standard capping residues of chloramphenicol, a toxic antibiotic. Their empirical analysis of crustacean imports in the United States, European Union, Canada and Japan suggests that both trade and welfare effects do not necessarily go in the same direction. However, they do not investigate the issue of inspections.
Background on seafood inspection by the FDA 6 Food safety in many advanced countries, including the United States, is implemented through HACCP, a preventive approach to food safety. This systematic preventive approach imposes food safety standards at critical junctures of food processing susceptible of contamination and health hazards to reduce health risk. The standard enforcement and the suppliers' compliance directly depend on the inspection policy.
The U.S. HACCP program for seafood is managed by the U.S. Food and Drug Administration (FDA). The FDA is supposed to inspect plants and products to make sure that they meet health standards included in and implied by the HACCP system. HACCP was initiated in 1997. The program has been repeatedly criticized as insufficient (GAO, 2001 and .
Several papers analyze FDA's seafood inspections, detentions and refusal decisions for products not meeting standards (Ababouch et al., 2005; Allshouse et al., 2003; Buzby et al., 2008) . Allshouse et al. (2003) provide the most detailed description. There are two types of detentions:
"Regular" detentions of shipments for which physical analysis shows that FDA standards are violated, and detentions without physical analysis. The latter include automatic detentions based on past violations and detentions based on import alerts. The detention without physical analysis is based on past history and/or other information leading to the resumption that the product (and further shipments) may not meet standard. In this case, the shipper or importer should prove that the product satisfies FDA standards. shipments subject to inspection. If requirements are satisfied by the 5 shipments, the importer is moved back to the random sampling list. In reality, inspections may not work as described above (Alberini et al., 2008; GAO, 2001 and . GAO (2001 GAO ( , 2004 
Externality and health cost
The externality is twofold. First, there is health risk exposure associated with consuming unsafe food, which is not internalized or known by the consumers. A major concern in that regard is the presence of bacteria (such as salmonella, E-coli, or Listeria monocytogenes) and the widespread use of chemical products and antibiotics to address this sanitary problem. In developing countries, seafood producers often use chloramphenicol to fight against bacteria, which leads to traceable residues in consumer products. There is a well established link between aplastic anemia, carcinogenicity, reproductive toxicity, and exposure to chloramphenicol. The science has not established a threshold for low levels of exposure to chloramphenicol (Food and Agriculture Organization, 2004) . The use of chloramphenicol mitigates unsafe production conditions in presence of salmonella, and E-coli among other bacteria but provides another risk of its own.
The second externality is the potential development of bacterial resistance to antibiotics associated with excessive use of antibiotics in seafood farms (Duran and Marshall, 2005) . The link of chloramphenicol to antibiotic resistance is tedious (World Health Organization, 2001) .
Although the science is still being established, a precautionary principle would be legitimate.
Consumers have expressed their willingness to pay for safer food and avoid bacteria such as salmonella (Hayes et al., 1995) . Roheim Wessells and Anderson (1995) undertake an experimental study to elicit the willingness to pay of Rhode-Island consumers for various seafood safety inspection and assurance programs using contingent valuation methods. Ten safety alternatives were considered. Respondents value specific information the most, such as date caught, catch site, and temperature since caught. The most valued characteristic was date caught valued at 47 cents above the price of US$ 4.5 per pound, roughly, a 10% premium.
Inspections by retailers and processors were the least valued forms of assurance of seafoodsafety. The authors also note the limited use of branding in seafood retailing and the lack of incentives to provide information for seafood harvesters. Holland and Roheim Wessells (1998) undertake a similar conjoint analysis for salmon. Strong preferences are elicited for USDA or FDA inspected products relative to non-inspected salmon. The willingness to pay for inspection is much stronger than for production method and price.
The health cost associated with seafood consumption is hard to pin down. The greater ignorance is on the number of seafood-borne illnesses. There is underreporting of cases and outbreaks, and consumers cannot attribute illness to a specific consumption. The lack of inspection and testing of seafood and long term impact of excessive residues of toxic substances and banned antibiotics contribute to the difficulty to estimate health cost. As noted before, FDA only inspects a small share of seafood import and detains about 2% of inspected seafood imports and actively tests a subset of these detained goods. Hence, less than 1% of seafood imports are formally tested (GAO, 2009; Allhouse et al., 2003) . Domestically, the FDA does better but still relies extensively on self-reporting by seafood producers and processors and only inspects a fraction of domestic seafood output. HACCP is not applied evenly to the whole industry (e.g., fish processed at sea is often exempted).
Cost of HACCP implementation for foreign and domestic producers
The literature suggests that the implementation cost of food safety standards by foreign producers in developing countries, are initially high. While the fixed cost of doing so is high, the marginal cost of maintaining these standards is small. This marginal cost is even smaller for U.S. domestic seafood producers. Cato and Subasinge (2003) A foreign producer has a probability f γ of being inspected when its product reaches the border (the same analysis is developed with probability of being inspected for the domestic producer). When products are inspected, the inspection provides perfect information about the products' safety at a marginal inspection cost H for the importing country. The inspection procedure is not subject to diagnostic errors for simplicity.
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With probability (1-γ f ) the foreign producer is not inspected. This producer is able to sell all products and to benefit from a per-unit price for the sold shrimps. A proportion of the products is non-contaminated, that is, there is no heath damage for the importing country. A proportion of the foreign products is contaminated and there is a per-unit external damage e for the consumer of the importing country. The proportion is exogenously given, which corresponds to a short-term situation for which producers cannot improve the safety of their products for reacting to an inspection policy. A similar assumption holds for domestic producers.
With probability f γ , imported shrimps are inspected and a proportion of them passes the 2 The proportion f λ could be interpreted as probability of having non-contaminated products and sell the products on the domestic market. It is assumed predetermined to the policy implementation. Making the proportion endogenous significantly complicates the computation of the optimum inspection rates without offering additional insight on the protectionist potential of the inspection policy under the domestic regulator. 3 The inspection procedure could be subject to a diagnostic error (false positive test) in an extension.
standard test and the producer receives the same per-unit price . The proportion fails the test and the producer loses this proportion of products. In this case, for simplicity we assume there is no way to sell and divest the rejected product elsewhere. We assume that the price received by the foreign producer is parametric (price-taker).
For a foreign producer the expected profit is
Profit maximization yields individual firm supply functions before the inspection equal to
.
By taking into account the probability of inspection and the proportion of safe products, the foreign supply effectively sold by the foreign producer (after the inspection) is
Using a similar approach for domestic producers, we assume that their expected profit is
where notations linked to subscript d have a similar interpretation to the one detailed for foreign producers. The domestic supply effectively sold by domestic producers (after the inspection) is
The demand of a representative consumer is derived from a quasi-linear utility function that consists of quadratic preferences for the market good of interest and an additive numéraire: , The aversion linked to a disease is captured by the term I r q − . The parameter I represents the knowledge regarding the disease, the aversion brought by the bad shrimps is captured by the negative sign and by parameter r, the overall damage per unit consumed.
We assume that consumers are not aware of the specific characteristic, or I=0. This assumption can be relaxed with I>0, particularly with an intense press coverage or by the effect of the country-of-origin labeling (COOL) program that may lead to product differentiation based on the origin, when safety levels differ according to the origin.
5 The maximization of this utility under budget constraint (v+pq=R) leads to the demand . The consumer surplus is then .
The expected damage per unit of consumption r is not internalized by consumers and is defined as following. Recall that if foreign products are not inspected with a probability (1
The COOL program is not always clearly identified by consumers. A causal observation at local grocery stores seems to confirm the little differentiation induced by COOL. Moreover, Lusk and Anderson (2004) show that consumers are made increasingly worse off with the program implementation. The imperfect substitution arising from COOL could be formalized with an Armington CES structure in demand.
contaminated foreign products enter the market in a proportion (1
. Foreign supplies are inspected with a probability f γ under which no contaminated products enter the market. With a per-unit damage e, the expected per unit damage linked to foreign products (after the inspection stage) is given by and the expected per unit damage linked to domestic products (after the inspection) is given by
. The expected damage per-sold unit is defined by
For a situation with given values of , the equilibrium price clears the market by equalizing demand and overall supply leading to an equilibrium quantity . Figure 1 shows domestic demand (D), foreign supply (S F ) and the total supply (S) (the domestic supply is omitted for clarity in figure 1 ). The price, p, is located on the vertical axis and the quantity, q, is shown along the horizontal axis. With both domestic and foreign products having some probability of being inspected at a marginal cost H, the overall cost of inspection is [ ( , , ) ( , ,
For an equilibrium price A p , the domestic welfare is defined by
Recall that and 
The "domestic" regulator maximizes the domestic welfare given by (7), while the regulator caring about global welfare maximizes the international welfare given by (8).
We now turn to the determination of the optimal probabilities , γ γ 
and with the second-order conditions for concavity being satisfied. For the "international"
regulator, the first-order conditions are given by ** ** ** **
with a similar check on second order conditions.
The social planners' problems cannot be solved analytically and we resort to simulations.
Before introducing the calibration linked to the shrimp market in the United States, we introduce basic simulations to highlight underlining important mechanisms.
One simple but illuminating case consists in assuming symmetric producers and no cost for food safety, implying f 
The Shrimp application
The model previously described is calibrated to estimate welfare effects linked to welfaremaximizing inspection rates which are implemented as inspection reinforcements over some initial arbitrary pre-existing levels. Prior to the reinforcement of the inspection, parameters of the model are initially calibrated such as to replicate prices and quantities for 2006 (see table 1).
With the observed quantity sold , the observed price Qp , and the direct price elasticity (3) and (5) Hudson et al. (2003) for shrimps in the United States by taking the average of own prices elasticities of demand over the 4 destinations in table 4 (p.236). 7 With the baseline scenario (before the reinforcement of the policy), it could be assumed that the initial inspection rate is equal to 0.01 or 0.01 γ = (close to the official statistics reported in SSA, 2007 or in GAO, 2001 ).
The following simulations provide useful information in a context where data linked to border inspections are difficult to collect. Ababouch, Gandini, and Ryder (2005) in their exhaustive study of border cases mention these difficulties arising from complex access to and treatment of data. The parameters selected for the simulation show diverse plausible situations that could emerge.
Several cases for the value of the per-unit damage e are presented in the simulations. For ease of interpretation, this damage can be expressed as a percentage of the initial-equilibrium price p used in the baseline scenario. We now turn to the results. . The third column presents surplus differences for different agents under the maximized international and domestic welfares. For each row, the value in column 3 is the difference between column 2 and column 1. All the scenarios assume a relative low cost of inspection (H=0.1) 
Domestic versus baseline

International versus baseline
International versus domestic
Optimum probabilities of inspection We first discuss case 1 of table 2, for which the per-unit damage e is high and equal to the Case 3 assumes a very high value of the per-unit damage e and similar foreign and domestic safety levels. In this case the optimum domestic policy corresponds to the foreign policy since the relatively high damage requires a systematic control of all products. Indeed both probabilities under both welfare maximizations reach the maximum equal to one, while the expected damage r completely disappears since no tainted products enter the domestic country.
In case 4, the per unit damage e is set low and leads to no inspections under the international welfare criteria, while the domestic regulator imposes inspections on foreign producers. Eventually, when the cost of inspection H increases relative to the per unit damage, the rates of inspection decrease for all cases 1 to 4 (a case that is not shown in the table 1).
In case 5, there is no protectionism since the controls would be counterproductive and they are equal to zero under both "maximized" domestic and international welfare. 8 Domestic consumers slightly benefit from the reduction of inspections compared to the baseline scenario because of relatively low damage e and savings from not implementing costly inspections and the absence of price distortion through inspections.
f λ A stringent inspection policy may influence the proportion of non-contaminated 8 The value of e for case 5 is likely to correspond to the one provided by experimental studies or by consumers' surveys. The percent price premium for safe products over conventional product is equal to 30%. We draw on the value suggested by Hayes et al. (1995) for the United States. In an experimental economics study, Hayes et al. (1995) found respondents willing to pay 15% to 30% more for food that is essentially completely safe from five pathogens in the United States, including salmonella. We could retain a value equal to w=0.3. We apply the price p used for the initial calibration, which means that the per-unit damage is equal to . Despite the cost differences, the effort by foreign producers is higher than the one by domestic producers, since the higher market share for foreign producers allow them to bear a larger sunk cost. We now turn to decisions taken by a regulator maximizing the domestic welfare or the international welfare and imposing the same standard on foreign and domestic producers. The regulator maximizing the domestic welfare would select a standard imposed to all firms. The regulator maximizing the international welfare would select a standard . As for the inspection policy, the domestic regulator will try to impose a higher standard since the fixed cost 
How to finance inspections?
This section complements the previous one, since it also shows that the way to finance the inspection may also have protectionist consequences. For selected levels of inspection decided by the regulator (as in the previous section), alternative ways to finance inspection could be selected if the regulator is missing public funds coming from federal taxes and/or if the program has to be self-sufficient. Two fiscal instruments can be considered, namely, a fixed fee (whatever the quantity sold) and a per-unit fee imposed on firms. For simplifying the analysis, those fees are the same for foreign and domestic producers, which differs from the previous section were discriminations were possible.
To further simplify the analytical expressions, we keep the previous notations and we assume a symmetric configuration for producers with f
Moreover, we assume ( ) ( ) 0 k K λ λ = = and 1 b = for the demand parameter in (6). Obviously, the results of this section could be combined with the previous results defining different probabilities ( , , , , )
For given values of λ and γ , the "domestic" regulator maximizes the domestic welfare given by (14) subject to (13), while the "international" regulator maximizes the international welfare given by (15) subject to (13). Result 1 and figure 3 are useful to illustrate the financing choices by a regulator balancing the budget defined by (13). The per-unit fee g is located along the horizontal axis, and the welfare is located along the vertical axis. When the domestic welfare is maximized, the per-unit fee is negative for relatively medium-values of H and the corresponding fixed fee is positive to balance budget constraint (13). It means that both firms mainly finance the inspection with a fixed fee that is not passed on to consumers into the price. This allows the domestic regulator to finance the inspection policy via the fixed fee that is incurred by domestic and foreign firms. One part of the financing is passed onto foreign firms (and countries) and not passed onto domestic consumers. The domestic choice is distorted compared to international one because the foreign country bears a larger share of the financing. As foreign producers are not considered in the domestic welfare, it is optimal to use the fixed fee not passed on to consumers. This result was overlooked in the previous 
Result 1. When domestic welfare is maximized, the per unit fee paid by all producers is
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This simple model of financing may lead to extensions. In particular, the exclusion of foreign producers could be studied. The financing instruments could be different between foreign and domestic producers, which would re-enforce the discrimination and the protectionism with higher positive fees imposed on foreign producers compared to domestic producers. The domestic regulator could be tempted to select fees such that the foreign profit is negative leading to foreign-producers exit ( ( , , , , ) 0 
Conclusion
This paper explored the potential protectionism of food safety inspection system to implement a food standard and its influence on safety choices by foreign and domestic producers selling food in the domestic market. Inspections play a key role to turn safety standards into a discriminatory implementation of the food standard, leading de facto to discriminatory effective or implemented standards, often raising the average quality of imports above that of domestic goods. The way these inspections are financed can also re-enforce the protectionist nature of the inspections. All these effects occur in absence of any rent seeking by firms. Even when considering global welfare, discriminatory non protectionist inspection can arise if domestic and foreign firms have heterogeneous cost structures.
This paper shows that more attention should be given to the way domestic and foreign products are inspected and the way these inspection policies are financed. Whatever the instrument (inspection, standard or fees for financing the regulation), we showed the comparison between a policy maximizing the domestic welfare and a policy maximizing the international welfare is necessary for delineating legitimate regulation reducing the consumer' damage from protectionism injuring foreign producers. A larger question is what should policy maker do in light of non discriminatory principles in trade agreements? For example, domestic treatment under the WTO would suggest that these differences in inspection rates and their financing may be inconsistent with the Agreement.
The empirical analysis raise interesting issues related to the actual U.S. policy. It seems to be neither a protectionist measure nor a catalyst, given its very low frequency of inspections.
Despite some shortcomings, welfare measures developed in this paper help streamline the amount of money earmarked to public-inspection programs. In essence, more attention should be given to the economic analysis of food safety of shrimps and to the optimal inspection policy at the border and in domestic plants and its welfare effects.
